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We study the interactions between the stock market and the labor market. When aggregate risk premiums
are time-varying, predictive variables for market excess returns should forecast long-horizon growth
in the marginal benefit of hiring and thereby long-horizon aggregate employment growth. Consistent
with this logic, we document that long-horizon payroll growth and  change in unemployment rate are
predictable with risk premium proxies. Lagged payroll growth and change in unemployment rate also
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We study the interactions between the stock market and aggregate employment by con-
sidering the eﬀect of time-varying expected returns in the standard search and matching
framework of the labor market (e.g., Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985)). When the
aggregate risk premiums are time-varying, labor market frictions imply that high risk pre-
miums should forecast low short-term employment growth but high long-term employment
growth, and that low risk premiums should forecast high short-term employment growth
but low long-term employment growth. Moreover, the marginal beneﬁt of hiring depends on
the discount rate, meaning that lagged employment growth based on past hiring decisions
should forecast stock market returns.
Our evidence lends support to these theoretical predictions. We use the growth rate
of seasonally adjusted total non-farm payrolls and change in seasonally adjusted civilian
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as the dependent variables in
long-horizon regressions. We ﬁnd that high values of the log consumption-wealth ratio of
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) predict low payroll growth and rising unemployment rate at
short horizons within two quarters, but high payroll growth and declining unemployment
rate at subsequent horizons. High values of the relative Treasury bill rate predict high pay-
roll growth and declining unemployment rate at short horizons, but low payroll growth and
climbing unemployment rate at long horizons. Unlike the popular macroeconomic predictors
such as lagged corporate proﬁt growth and lagged growth of gross domestic product that
forecast employment growth at short horizons within four quarters, the risk premium proxies
contain predictive power primarily at long horizons that range from eight to 16 quarters.
We also ﬁnd that lagged payroll growth is a strong negative predictor for future stock
market excess returns. In univariate regressions ranging from one-quarter to 16-quarter hori-
zons, the adjusted R2 peaks at 9% at the four-quarter horizon. The slopes are universally
negative, signiﬁcant for horizons up to eight quarters, and marginally signiﬁcant at subse-
quent horizons in our 1952–2007 sample. Intriguingly, judged on the t-statistics and adjusted
R2s in univariate regressions, the predictive power of payroll growth dominates that of stan-
2dard risk premium proxies such as the default spread and the relative Treasury bill rate.
Whereas the dividend yield and the term spread concentrate their predictive power at long
horizons (in 12 and 16 quarters), the forecasting power of payroll growth is the strongest in
relatively short business cycle frequencies within four quarters. Payroll growth even retains
signiﬁcant predictive power from four to 12 quarters ahead in multiple regressions that also
include the dividend yield, the default spread, the term spread, the relative bill rate, and the
log consumption-wealth ratio. Finally, change in unemployment rate has some predictive
power for market excess returns, but is somewhat weaker than that of payroll growth.
Our work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, a long literature in macroeco-
nomics has examined the impact of the stock market on aggregate investment (e.g., Fischer
and Merton (1984), Barro (1990), Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), and Lettau and
Ludvigson (2002)). However, probably because of the long-standing divide between labor
economics and ﬁnance, we are not aware of any prior studies that examine the impact
of the stock market on aggregate employment. This void is surprising, especially because
employment and the stock market are of ﬁrst-order importance in understanding aggregate
economic ﬂuctuations. We take a ﬁrst stab at ﬁlling this gap. Going from the other direction,
investment has received much attention in the ﬁnance literature as a driver for stock market
returns (e.g., Cochrane (1991)) and cross-sectional returns (e.g., Cochrane (1996) and Xing
(2008)). Employment again has largely been ignored. A few exceptions include Merz and
Yashiv (2007), who quantify the role of labor in explaining aggregate stock valuation, and
Bazdresch, Belo, and Lin (2009), who show that high ﬁrm-level employment growth predicts
low average returns. Our work diﬀers because we examine time series predictability of stock
market returns and the impact of the stock market on aggregate employment.
Second, a voluminous literature in ﬁnance has studied the time series predictability of
stock market excess returns (e.g., Fama and French (1989), Cochrane (1991), and Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001)). However, this literature has largely ignored labor market variables.
Our work shows that lagged payroll growth is a strong predictor of stock market excess
returns, and that its predictive power is at least comparable with, if not stronger than, that
of traditional forecasting variables such as the default premium, the short-term Treasury bill
3rate, the dividend yield, and the term spread.
The rest is organized as follows. Section 2 uses the standard search and matching model
to guide the subsequent empirical analysis, Section 3 describes our data sources and empirical
speciﬁcations, Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We formulate the search and matching model following Yashiv (2000) and Merz and Yashiv
(2007). The model is analogous to q-theory of Tobin (1969) and Cochrane (1991).
2.1 The Setup
The economy is populated by identical workers and identical ﬁrms. Time is discrete and
horizon inﬁnite. Labor is the only input in a constant-return-to-scale production function:
the operating proﬁts are given by π(nt,xt) = f(xt)nt, in which nt is total employment and
xt is productivity shock. To attract new workers, a ﬁrm needs to post a number of job va-
cancies, νt. For each vacancy posted, the ﬁrm takes as given the probability µt at which the
vacancy is ﬁlled. The ﬁrm’s gross hires are given by µtνt. Workers are paid a gross compen-
sation rate of wt. Hiring costs include both the cost of advertising, screening, and selecting
new workers, and the cost of training. These costs depend on the stock of employment, the
number of vacancies, and the probability of ﬁlling the vacancy.
For simplicity, we assume that the hiring costs function is quadratic: (a/2)(µtνt/nt)2nt,
in which a > 0. In particular, the hiring costs are increasing and convex in the number of new
hires (the costs depend on µt and νt only through their product) and are decreasing in the
stock of employment. These properties are desirable because training costs and costs of time
spent on screening and selecting new workers increase with the number of new hires. Firms
make hiring decisions at the beginning of each period t, and the new hires enter production in
the beginning of period t+1. Separation of workers from jobs occurs at a constant rate of 0 ≤
s ≤ 1, which ﬁrms take as exogenous. The stock of employment therefore evolves as follows:
nt+1 = (1 − s)nt + µtνt (1)
4Firms choose the number of job vacancies to post each period to maximize the discounted
present value of future free cash ﬂows. When discounting, ﬁrms take as given the stochastic


















subject to equation (1). Let qt denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the con-
straint in equation (1), and is the marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of employment.


















+ (1 − s)qt+1
￿￿
(4)
Equation (3) says that the marginal beneﬁt of hiring equals the marginal cost of hiring.
Equation (4) says that the marginal beneﬁt of hiring equals the next period marginal product
of labor net of gross compensation plus the saving of hiring costs due to economy of scale and
the continuation value of the employment stock net of separation, discounted to t using mt+1.
Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions, using equation (1) to substitute out µtνt, and
simplifying, we obtain Et[mt+1rt+1] = 1, in which rt+1 is deﬁned as:
rt+1 =
f(xt+1) − wt+1 + (a/2)(nt+2/nt+1)2 − (a/2)(1 − s)2
a(nt+1/nt) − a(1 − s)
(5)
This equation says that rt+1 is the ratio of the marginal beneﬁt of hiring at period t + 1 di-
vided by the marginal cost of hiring at period t. Cochrane (1991) shows that under constant
returns to scale, this ratio equals the stock return, state by state and period by period.
2.2 Empirical Implications
When the left-hand side is equated to the stock market return, equation (5) provides the theo-
retical foundation for our empirical analysis. The empirical ﬁnance literature has documented
a list of proxies that forecast market excess returns. Because the interest rate is essentially
unpredictable, these predictors are proxies for the expected market return, Et[rt+1]. Equation
5(5) implies that regressing short-horizon employment growth, nt+1/nt, on proxies for Et[rt+1]
should yield negative slopes, but regressing long-horizon employment growth, nt+2/nt, on
these proxies should yield positive slopes. Speciﬁcally, the conditioning variables that predict
future market excess returns with a positive sign (such as the log consumption-wealth ratio)
should have signiﬁcantly negative slopes in forecasting short-term employment growth, but
signiﬁcantly positive slopes in forecasting long-term employment growth. The conditioning
variables that predict future stock returns with a negative sign (such as the relative Trea-
sury bill rate) should have signiﬁcantly positive slopes in forecasting short-term employment
growth, but signiﬁcantly negative slopes in forecasting long-term employment growth.
Equation (5) also has implications for the predictability of market excess returns. If em-
ployment growth is persistent, meaning that lagged employment growth, nt/nt−1, forecasts
current employment growth, nt+1/nt, with a positive slope, then lagged employment growth
also should forecast market excess return, rt+1, with a negative slope. And this forecasting
power should concentrate in short horizons: it is rt+1, not, for example, rt+2, that shows
up in the left-hand side of equation (5). A careful reader may wonder why we use lagged
employment growth, instead of just current employment growth, to predict returns. Strictly
speaking, in the context of the model with one-period time-to-build (more accurately, time-
to-ﬁll), nt+1 is known at the beginning of period t. As such, nt+1/nt can be used, at least
in principle, to predict rt+1 that goes from the beginning to the end of period t. However,
in the data, both rt+1 and nt+1 are observable only at the end of period t, meaning that we
should use lagged employment growth to avoid look-ahead bias in forecasting returns.
2.3 The Importance of Labor Market Frictions
Equation (5) highlights the importance of labor market frictions in driving the predictability
of employment growth with risk premium proxies and the predictability of market excess
returns with lagged employment growth. There are two types of frictions embedded in the
model: hiring costs and one-period time-to-build. Without search and matching costs, a = 0,
equation (5) collapses to rt+1 = f(xt+1) − wt+1. There is no connection between the labor
and ﬁnancial markets, and the stock market return is independent of aggregate employment
6growth across various horizons. Intuitively, in a frictionless world, employment is perfectly
elastic to changes in the discount rate, meaning that a small change in the discount rate is
associated with an inﬁnite magnitude of change in employment. As such, regressing future
returns on past employment growth yields a zero slope: returns are not predictable using
past employment growth.1
The one-period time-to-build is embedded in equation (1): hiring at time t, µtνt, only
leads to more productive workers at the beginning of t + 1. The eﬀect of this friction is
intuitive. The length of the decision period (one month, one quarter, one year, or longer)
is unspeciﬁed in the model. If the decision period is one year, then equation (5) says that
regressing employment growth up to four quarters ahead on risk premiums should yield neg-
ative slopes, and that regressing employment growth at longer horizons on risk premiums
should yield positive slopes. If the decision period is one quarter instead, then we should only
see negative slopes from using the one-quarter ahead employment growth as the dependent
variable. Employment growth at longer-than-one-quarter horizons should give us positive
slopes. As such, the horizon at which the regression slopes switch signs empirically provides
at least an informal sense about the length of the decision period.
This mechanism of time-to-build is subtly diﬀerent from the investment (hiring) lag story
discussed in Lamont (2000) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2002). Hiring lag is also called time-
to-plan: there are lags between the decision to hire and the actual hiring expenditure. To
clarify the issues, Figure 1 illustrates further the basic intuition by depicting the hypotheti-
cal responses of realized returns, stock prices, employment growth, and hiring to a one-time
shock to the expected return. For the standard one-period time-to-build model (Panel A),
a discount rate drop at the beginning of t generates higher stock prices and positive stock
returns observed at the beginning of t. Without additional frictions, the level of hiring over
period t rises immediately. With one-period time-to-build, employment stock, nt+1, increases
only at the beginning of t + 1, meaning that employment growth over period t is positive.
Further, because the discount rate at the beginning of t drops, the realized return over period
1Li and Zhang (2009) argue that without investment costs, investment is perfectly elastic to discount rate
changes. With investment costs, investment is less elastic, and a given change in investment is associated with
a larger change in the discount rate. Equivalently, investment is a more powerful predictor of future returns.
7t, denoted rt+1, declines on average. Stock prices also drop, along with the hiring over period
t+1. Again, with the standard one-period time-to-build, employment stock decreases at the
beginning of t+2, meaning that employment growth over period t+1 is negative. The bottom-
line is that regressing short-term employment growth, nt+1/nt, on the discount rate, Et[rt+1],
should yield negative slopes, but regressing long-term employment growth, nt+2/nt+1, should
yield positive signs. However, regressing change in hiring rate, (µt+1νt+1 − µtνt)/nt, on the
discount rate should only yield positive signs without sign ﬂips at longer horizons.
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of two-period time-to-build, which means that
hiring commitment at the beginning of t, µtνt, only leads to more productive workers at the
beginning of t+2. A discount rate drop at the beginning of t generates higher stock prices and
positive stock returns observed at the beginning of t. Hiring goes up immediately, but with
two-period time-to-build, employment stock at the beginning of t + 1 remains unchanged.
Because the discount rate at the beginning of t drops, the realized return over period t,
denoted rt+1, declines on average. Stock prices at the beginning of t + 1 and hiring over
period t + 1 both fall. However, employment stock at the beginning of t + 2 now increases
as a result of hiring two periods ago. At period t+2, stock prices, stock returns, and hiring
remain constant because we only analyze one-time shock to the discount rate at the beginning
of t. However, employment stock at the beginning of t+3 now decreases as a result of ﬁring
at t + 1. The bottomline is that regressing employment growth up to t + 2, nt+2/nt, on the
discount rate, Et[rt+1], should yield negative slopes, but regressing long-term employment
growth, nt+3/nt+2, should yield positive signs. As such, the eﬀect of two-period time-to-build
is to prolong the horizon over which the slopes switch signs by one more period. However, the
dynamics of the change in hiring rate remains the same: regressing (µt+1νt+1 − µtνt)/nt on
the discount rate continues to yield only positive signs without sign ﬂips at longer horizons.
Panel C of Figure 1 analyzes the eﬀect of one-period time-to-build along with one-period
time-to-plan as in Lettau and Ludvigson (2002). As in the previous two cases, a discount
rate drop at the beginning of t generates higher stock prices and positive stock returns. With
one-period time-to-plan, hiring only rises in the next period, while remaining unchanged in
the current period. Accordingly, employment stock at the beginning of t + 1 remains un-
8changed. Because the discount rate at the beginning of t drops, the realized return over
period t, denoted rt+1, declines on average. Stock prices at the beginning of t + 1 drop and
cause ﬁrms to commit to decreasing hiring over the next period. However, because of the
hiring commitment made at period t, hiring rises in period t + 1. With only one-period
time-to-build, employment stock increases at the beginning of t + 2. At period t + 2, stock
prices and returns are constant, hiring falls per the prior commitment, and employment
stock falls at the beginning of t + 3. Comparing Panels B and C shows that the dynamics
of employment growth are the same. However, the hiring dynamics are diﬀerent: regressing
change in hiring rate, (µt+1νt+1 − µtνt)/nt, on the discount rate now yields negative slopes
in short horizons but positive slopes in long horizons.
3 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcations
For stock market returns, we use the returns on the Standard and Poor (S&P) index of 500
stocks from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The sample is quarterly from
1952 to 2007. Let rt denote the log return of the S&P index and rft the log return on the one-
month Treasury bill as a proxy for the risk-free rate. The log market excess return is rt−rft.
We use two variables from Bureau of Economic Analysis to measure the state of aggre-
gate employment. The ﬁrst is the growth rate of payroll (seasonally adjusted total non-farm
payrolls of all employees), and the second is the change in unemployment rate (seasonally
adjusted civilian unemployment rate). The payroll growth is procyclical, and the change
in unemployment rate is countercyclical (e.g., Stock and Watson (1999)). We also use the
growth rate of average weekly hours (seasonally adjusted average weekly hours of total pri-
vate industries from the Bureau of Economic Analysis). We brieﬂy discuss the results using
the (procyclical) growth rate of average weekly hours in the main text but delegate the
detailed tables to the Internet Appendix to save space.
The empirical ﬁnance literature has documented a list of ﬁnancial variables that forecast
market excess returns. Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988), and Hodrick
(1992) show that the dividend-to-price ratio predicts future excess returns. We measure
the S&P dividend yield, denoted DP, as the natural logarithm of the sum of the past four
9quarters of dividends per share minus the natural logarithm of the S&P 500 index level. The
source for the S&P index and its dividends is CRSP. Fama and Schwert (1977) and Fama
(1981) ﬁnd that the relative Treasury bill rate predicts returns. We measure the relative
bill rate, denoted TB, as the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board
minus its four-quarter moving average.
Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Fama and French (1989) document the forecasting
power of the term premium and the default premium. We measure the term premium,
TRM, as the diﬀerence between the ten-year Treasury bond yield and three-month Trea-
sury bill yield from the Federal Reserve Board. The default premium, denoted DEF, is
the diﬀerence between the BAA-rated corporate bond yield and the AAA-rated corporate
bond yield from the Federal Reserve Board. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) show that the log
consumption-to-wealth ratio, CAY, predicts excess market returns. We obtain the data of
CAY from Sydney Ludvigson’s Web site.
To quantify the incremental predictive content of these risk premium proxies for future
aggregate employment, we use a group of macro control variables used in prior studies to
forecast future macroeconomic performance (e.g., Barro (1990) and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2002)). These macro controls are: lagged payroll growth, De; lagged change in unemploy-
ment rate, Du; lagged growth of average weekly hours, Dw; lagged corporate proﬁt growth,
Dproﬁt, measured as the growth of the after-tax corporate proﬁt with inventory valuation
and capital consumption adjustments, seasonally adjusted in current dollars, from the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis; lagged growth of gross domestic product, Dgdp, measured as
the growth of gross domestic product (GDP), seasonally adjusted in chain-weighted 2000
dollars, from Bureau of Economic Analysis; and the growth of average Q, Dq.
We deﬁne a ﬁrm’s average Q as the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm’s assets to its
book value of total assets (Compustat annual item 6). The market value of the ﬁrm equals
the market value of common equity (share price at the end of the ﬁscal year [item 199] times
common shares outstanding [item 25]) plus the book value of preferred stock (in sequence of
availability, items 10, 56, 130) plus the book value of total debt (the sum of total short-term
debt [item 9] and total long-term debt [item 34]). We calculate the aggregate average Q as
10the aggregate market value of assets divided by the aggregate value of book assets (exclud-
ing ﬁnancial ﬁrms). Because the average Q series is annual, we assign last year’s Q to each
quarter in the current year in predictive regressions with quarterly data.
Our empirical speciﬁcations are the standard long-horizon predictive regressions (e.g.,
Fama and French (1989) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2002)). To forecast market excess re-
turns, the dependent variable is the H-quarter log excess return on the S&P 500 composite
index,
PH
h=1 rt+h − rft+h, in which H is the forecast horizon ranging from one quarter to 16
quarters. To forecast labor market performance, the dependent variables are: the H-quarter
growth of total non-farm payroll, et+H −et, in which et is the natural logarithm of total non-
farm payroll in quarter t; the H-quarter change in civilian unemployment rate, ut+H −ut, in
which ut is the unemployment rate in quarter t; and the H-quarter growth of average weekly
hours, wt+H −wt, in which wt is the average weekly hours in private industries in quarter t.
For each regression, we report the slopes, the adjusted R2, and two sets of t-statistics: t-
statistics calculated from standard errors corrected for autocorrelations per Newey and West
(1987) and t-statistics calculated from standard errors adjusted for the use of overlapping
observations in long-horizon regressions per Hodrick (1992). Both sets of t-statistics test the
null hypothesis that a given slope coeﬃcient equals zero. Presenting both sets of t-statistics
is important: Ang and Bekaert (2007) show that Newey-West t-statistics can overreject the
null hypothesis of no predictability at long horizons, but that Hodrick t-statistics retain the
correct size in small samples.
4 Empirical Results
Section 4.1 provides background on time-varying aggregate risk premiums by presenting
up-to-date long-horizon forecasts of market excess returns with standard predictive vari-
ables from empirical ﬁnance. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 report our key empirical results that risk
premium proxies provide substantial predictive power for long-horizon labor market perfor-
mance. Finally, Section 4.4 shows that payroll growth and change in unemployment rate
also forecast market excess returns.
114.1 Forecasting Market Excess Returns
Using an updated sample through 2007, Table 1 reports the long-horizon forecasts of S&P 500
index excess returns. Panel A shows that the dividend yield shows some ability to forecast
excess returns. The adjusted R2 increases monotonically from 1% in the one-quarter horizon
to 5% in the four-quarter horizon and further to 12% in the 12-quarter horizons. The slopes
are all positive with the Newey-West t-statistics above 1.6 in short horizons and above two
in horizons longer than eight quarters. But these long-horizon t-statistics are likely clouded
by overlapping observations: the Hodrick t-statistics decrease below 1.6 as the horizon goes
beyond four quarters. Using the same empirical speciﬁcations but in a shorter sample that
ends in 1999, Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) document weak evidence of predictability with
the dividend yield: the maximal adjusted R2 is only 3% and the Newey-West and Hodrick
t-statistics are all below 1.5. The evidence suggests that the dividend yield’s predictive power
has substantially increased over the past ten years probably because market valuation ratios
have mean-reverted from their exceedingly high levels in the late 1990s.
Consistent with Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2002), Panel B of Table 1 shows that the
log consumption-to-wealth ratio, CAY, reliably predicts market excess returns. The adjusted
R2 starts at 6% at the quarterly horizon, rises to 16% at the four-quarter horizon, and in-
creases further to 38% at the 16-quarter horizon. The slopes are universally positive and the
Newey-West t-statistics are above four across all horizons. The Hodrick t-statistics start at
4.3 at the quarterly horizon, decreases to 3.6 at the four-quarter horizon, but still remains
at 2.7 at the 16-quarter horizon.
From Panel C, the relative bill rate forecasts excess returns with a negative slope, but
the explanatory power concentrates in short horizons within four quarters. The term spread
forecasts excess returns with a positive slope, and the explanatory power seems to increase
with horizon (Panel D). Newey-West t-statistics for the slopes are signiﬁcant beyond the
eight-quarter horizon, but the Hodrick t-statistics are only marginally signiﬁcant. As in the
sample through 1999 used by Lettau and Ludvigson (2002), the default spread does not show
any univariate forecasting power for excess returns in our sample (Panel E). Panel F forecasts
excess returns using all ﬁve regressors. CAY is the only predictor that shows consistent and
12reliable forecasting power across all horizons. The dividend yield and the term spread show
marginal forecasting power at long horizons, but the two sets of t-statistics give inconsistent
inferences. The relative bill rate loses its forecasting power at short horizons, and the default
spread remains ineﬀective. In all, the evidence suggests that long-horizon excess returns are
predictable and that CAY is the most robust risk premium proxy.
4.2 Do Risk Premium Proxies Forecast Aggregate Employment?
To preview the results, we ﬁnd that time-varying aggregate risk premiums are negatively cor-
related with short-horizon employment growth but positively correlated with long-horizon
employment growth, as predicted by the search model in Section 2.
Payroll Growth
Table 2 reports the long-horizon regressions of the quarterly growth rate of total non-farm
payrolls on the predictive variables for excess returns from Table 1. Panel A shows that the
dividend yield forecasts short-horizon payroll growth with a negative slope and long-horizon
payroll growth with a positive slope. Although the sign pattern of the predictive relation is
consistent with theory, the predictability evidence is weak: the slopes across diﬀerent hori-
zons are all within 1.6 standard errors from zero. Panel B shows that the results using CAY
as a risk premium proxy are stronger than those using the dividend yield. High values of
CAY predict low payroll growth at short horizons but high payroll growth at long horizons.
The Hodrick t-statistics start at 1.7 at the eight-quarter horizon and increase to 2.1 and
2.3 at the 12- and 16-quarter horizons, respectively. The adjusted R2 increases from 2%
at the eight-quarter horizon to 5% at the 16-quarter horizon. CAY also shows marginally
signiﬁcant predictive power of payroll growth in the one-quarter horizon: the negative slope
has a Newey-West t-statistic of −1.6 and a Hodrick t-statistic of −1.9.
From Panel C, the results from the relative bill rate also conform to the search model’s
predictions. High values of the relative bill rate predict low risk premiums (see Table 1), and
therefore high payroll growth at short horizons and low payroll growth at long horizons. The
signiﬁcance of the sign pattern is even stronger than that from using CAY: the Hodrick t-
statistics of the relative rate’s slope start at 3.4 at the one-quarter horizon, decrease to 2.6 at
13the two-quarter horizon and further to 0.5 at the four-quarter horizon, before turning signiﬁ-
cantly negative with magnitude all above three from the eight-quarter horizon and onwards.
Consistent with Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2002) results that the term spread has strong
forecasting power for investment growth (replicated with the updated sample through 2007
in the Internet Appendix), the term spread also has strong forecasting power for payroll
growth. However, the slopes are positive and mostly signiﬁcant across all horizons: the
sign pattern does not conform to the search model. Following Lettau and Ludvigson, we
interpret the evidence as indicating the term spread’s strong forecasting power for output
growth (e.g., Stock and Watson (1989) and Chen (1991)). It is likely that the eﬀect of the
term spread works primarily through the cash ﬂow channel, as opposed to the risk premium
channel that we focus on. Consistent with this interpretation, the term spread is indeed a
weaker risk premium proxy than CAY across all horizons (see Table 1).
From Panel E of Table 2, the default spread predicts payroll growth with signiﬁcantly
negative slopes at short horizons but with insigniﬁcantly positive slopes at long horizons. Al-
though the sign pattern is consistent with the search model, the strength of the predictability
at long horizons is negligible. However, this evidence might suggest that the default spread
is a weak risk premium proxy at long horizons, as shown in Table 1. Panel F reports long-
horizon multiple regressions of payroll growth with all the risk premium proxies. All the
proxies show marginal predictive power for payroll growth at some horizons. With all ﬁve
proxies included, the empirical speciﬁcation has reliable predictive power for payroll growth
at every horizon, with the adjusted R2 varying from 13% to 23%.
In all, we document that risk premiums are negatively correlated with payroll growth at
short horizons but positively correlated with payroll growth at long horizons. As such, risk
premium proxies such as CAY and the relative bill rate also forecast long-horizon payroll
growth. The sign patterns of the predictive relations using the dividend yield and the default
spread go in the right direction, but their long-horizon predictive power is insigniﬁcant. The
term spread has strong forecasting power for payroll growth, but this ability likely derives
from its forecasting power for output growth, as opposed to time-varying risk premiums.
We also have documented long-horizon regressions of the growth rate of average weekly
14hours on risk premium proxies (see the Internet Appendix). This variable has been used
in the literature to as an indicator of labor market performance (e.g., Stock and Watson
(1999)). Without showing the details, we can report that CAY, the term spread, and to a
lesser extent, the default spread all predict the weekly hours growth with signiﬁcantly positive
slopes, especially at long horizons. The relative bill rate predicts the weekly hours growth
with signiﬁcantly negative slopes across all horizons. More important, there is no dynamic
sign pattern as in the case of predicting payroll growth. The evidence suggests that adjusting
average weekly hours is a smooth process without any lags, whereas adjusting total non-farm
payrolls is a more sluggish process. Adjusting payrolls means hiring and ﬁring workers, a
process involving search and matching that are time-consuming and costly (e.g., Mortensen
(1982) and Pissarides (1985)). In contrast, adjusting weekly hours means changing the
utilization rate of existing workers, a process that is likely to be relatively smooth.
Change in Unemployment Rate
Table 3 reports the long-horizon regressions of change in unemployment rate on risk pre-
mium proxies. Because the dependent variable is countercyclical, the null hypothesis from
the search and matching model is that time-varying risk premiums should predict change
in unemployment rate with a positive sign at short horizons but a negative sign at long
horizons. From Panel A, although the dividend yield produces the right sign pattern, the
predictability evidence is weak: all the slopes are within 1.5 standard errors from zero. In-
deed, the negative slopes at long horizons have magnitudes close to zero. And the adjusted
R2 is tiny across all horizons.
Panel B shows that CAY produces a sign pattern of slopes consistent with theory: high
values of CAY predict positive changes in unemployment rate at the one-quarter horizon,
but negative changes in unemployment rate thereafter. In particular, the slope’s Hodrick
t-statistics rise (in magnitude) from −1.3 at the four-quarter horizon to −2.2 in the eight-
quarter horizon and further to around −2.5 at the 12- and 16-quarter horizons. The pattern
of the Newey-West t-statistics is largely similar. CAY’s predictive power concentrates mostly
at long horizons: the adjusted R2 increases monotonically from zero at the four-quarter hori-
15zon to 6% at the eight-quarter horizon, to 12% at the 12-quarter horizon, and further to
17% at the 16-quarter horizon.
Panel C of Table 3 shows that the sign pattern of the relative bill rate is again consistent
with the search model. Because the relative bill rate is procyclical, high values of the relative
rate should predict negative changes in the unemployment rate at short horizons but positive
changes at long horizons. The predictive power of this risk premium proxy again concen-
trates at long horizons: the adjusted R2 is close to zero at the horizons up to four quarters
but varies from 15% to 18% at horizons longer than eight quarters. The Hodrick t-statistics
for the slope increase from 1.8 at the four-quarter horizon to 3.9 at the eight-quarter horizon
and further to 4.1 at the 16-quarter horizon. However, the slope at the one-quarter horizon,
although negative, is close to zero.
Consistent with the results of forecasting payroll growth (see Table 2), Panel D of Table
3 shows that the term spread has strong predictive power for long-horizon changes in unem-
ployment rate. The adjusted R2 starts at 8% at the one-quarter horizon, increases to 27%
at the four-quarter horizon, peaks at 44% at the eight-quarter horizon, before dropping to
38% at the 12-quarter horizon and 29% at the 16-quarter horizon. The slopes are negative
and signiﬁcant across all horizons: the Newey-West t-statistics vary from −3.14 to −7.48
and the Hodrick t-statistics vary from −2.99 to −4.71. As such, high values of the term
spread strongly signal declines in the unemployment rate, and low values of the term spread
strongly signal increases in the unemployment rate across all horizons. However, the sign
pattern does not conform to the search model.
Our evidence on forecasting payroll growth and change in unemployment rate with the
term spread adds to the large body of evidence on the predictive power of the term spread for
real economic activity. Harvey (1988) documents the predictive relation of the term spread
with consumption growth. Laurent (1988), Stock and Watson (1989), and Chen (1991) show
that the term spread forecasts output growth. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) report that
the term spread predicts the growth of gross national product, consumption (nondurables
plus services), consumption durables, investment, and recession probabilities. As noted,
Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) show that the term spread has strong forecasting power for
16investment growth. Our evidence lends support to the view that the term spread is strongly
aﬀected by inﬂationary expectations and monetary policy and that the predictive power of
the term spread for economic growth depends on the degree to which the Federal Reserve
reacts to deviations in output from its long-term trend (e.g., Estrella (2005)). The term
spread tends to rise when the Federal Reserve cuts the short-term interest rate to stimu-
late the economy, and a boom in economic activity and inﬂation typically follows such a
policy move with a lag. And the term spread tends to fall when the Federal Reserve raises
the short-term interest rate to curb the inﬂation, and a slowdown in economic activity and
inﬂation typically follows with a lag.
From Panel E of Table 3, the sign pattern of the predictive relation between the default
premium and change in unemployment rate is consistent with the search model. The default
spread has positive slopes at short horizons within four quarters and negative slopes at long
horizons above eight quarters. The slopes are mostly insigniﬁcant, however. The adjusted R2
pattern shows that the forecasting power again concentrates at long horizons: the adjusted
R2 is 2% at the one-quarter horizon, but is 6% at the 12-quarter horizon and 11% at the 16-
quarter horizon. Panel F reports the long-horizon forecasts of changes in unemployment rate
using all ﬁve predictive variables. The sign pattern of the dividend yield reverses, but the
slopes are mostly within one standard error from zero. CAY, the relative bill rate, and the
default spread continue to produce the right sign pattern. In particular, high values of CAY
forecast signiﬁcant increases in unemployment rate at short horizons within two quarters but
signiﬁcant declines in unemployment rate at the 16-quarter horizon. Finally, high values of
the term spread continue to forecast strong declines in unemployment rate across all horizons.
With all the predictive variables included, the regression speciﬁcation shows strong forecast-
ing power: the adjusted R2 increases monotonically from 19% in the one-quarter horizon to
30% in the four-quarter horizon and further to 43% at horizons longer than eight quarters.
174.3 Do Risk Premium Proxies Forecast Aggregate Employment
Relative to Macro Controls?
We have shown so far that long-horizon payroll growth and change in unemployment rate
are predictable by a standard set of risk premium proxies. Because the labor market is
an important component of the macroeconomy, future payroll growth and change in unem-
ployment rate also are likely to be connected with past macroeconomic performance. We
ask whether the risk premium proxies contain any information about future labor market
performance beyond that contained in a set of macro control variables. As noted, we follow
Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) and include as macro controls lagged payroll growth, lagged
change in unemployment rate, lagged corporate proﬁt growth, lagged growth rate of average
Q, and lagged GDP growth.
Table 4 reports the forecasts of payroll growth with macro controls. In univariate re-
gressions, the lagged values of payroll growth, corporate proﬁt growth, and GDP growth
all predict future payroll growth with a positive sign. Unlike risk premium proxies, their
predictive power mostly concentrates at short horizons with the adjusted R2 all peaking
at the one-quarter horizon. The adjusted R2 starts at 47% at the one-quarter horizon for
lagged payroll growth, declines to 16% at the four-quarter horizon, and further to 2% at the
eight-quarter horizon. The adjusted R2 of lagged corporate proﬁt growth starts at 24% at
the one-quarter horizon, declines to 17% at the four-quarter horizon, and further to 5% and
2% at the 12- and 16-quarter horizons, respectively. The slope of the lagged corporate proﬁt
growth remains signiﬁcant at long horizons, however. In contrast, lagged growth of average
Q does not appear to predict future payroll growth. The adjusted R2 is below 3% across all
horizons, and the slopes are all within 1.6 standard errors from zero. Moreover, the slope
is positive at the one-quarter horizon before turning negative at subsequent horizons. The
dynamic sign pattern suggests that the growth of average Q is likely a (weak) risk premium
proxy. This interpretation seems reasonable because the aggregate book-to-market ratio
predicts market excess returns (e.g., Kothari and Shanken (1997)).
When all four controls are included into the speciﬁcation, lagged payroll growth retains
its predictive content within four quarters. Lagged GDP growth remains signiﬁcant across all
18horizons up to and including the 12-quarter horizon. Lagged corporate proﬁt growth loses its
predictive power: most of the slopes are insigniﬁcantly negative. Lagged average Q growth
has signiﬁcantly negative slopes at most horizons. The adjusted R2 pattern again suggests
that the predictive power of the macro controls concentrates mostly at short horizons.
Table 5 reports the forecasts of changes in unemployment rate with macro controls. The
dependent variable seems persistent at short horizons: the lagged value has signiﬁcantly
positive slopes and the adjusted R2 varies from 9% to 21% at horizons within four quarters.
In univariate regressions, high values of lagged corporate proﬁt growth and lagged GDP
growth forecast declines in unemployment rate. The slopes of the lagged corporate proﬁt
growth remain signiﬁcant across all horizons up to 16 quarters, and the slopes of the lagged
GDP growth remain signiﬁcant up to eight quarters. The forecasting power of both pre-
dictors again concentrates at short horizons within four quarters: the adjusted R2 declines
rapidly beyond the four-quarter horizon. High values of lagged average Q growth predict
increases in unemployment rate at long horizons, although the slopes are only marginally
signiﬁcant. The adjusted R2 rises from −1% to 9% as the horizon extends from one quarter
to 16 quarters. When we include all four macro controls in the speciﬁcation, high values of
lagged change in unemployment rate forecast signiﬁcant declines of unemployment rate at
long horizons. Lagged corporate proﬁt growth loses its forecasting power. High values of
lagged GDP growth and low values of average Q growth predict signiﬁcant declines in un-
employment rate across all horizons. The shape of the adjusted R2 pattern is more uniform:
it starts at 28% at the one-quarter horizon, peaks at 35% at the four-quarter horizon, and
declines only to 27% at the 12-quarter horizon and further to 18% at the 16-quarter horizon.
With this background, we can examine to what extent the risk premium proxies contain
information about future payroll growth and change in unemployment rate, information that
is not already captured by macro controls. Table 6 assesses the marginal predictive power
for payroll growth, and Table 7 assesses that for change in unemployment rate, of each risk
premium proxy relative to the four macro controls. The ﬁrst ﬁve panels in each of the tables
report the forecasts over various horizons, adding the dividend yield, CAY, the relative bill
rate, the term spread, and the default spread, one at a time, to the set of four macro controls.
19The last panel in each table reports the forecasts using all nine regressors including the ﬁve
risk premium proxies and the four macro controls.
Table 6 shows that when added one at a time into the payroll growth regression with
the macro controls, the dividend yield and CAY both reproduce their dynamic sign pattern
consistent with the search and matching model. However, the slopes of the dividend yield are
within 1.3 standard errors from zero at long horizons, albeit still positive, and CAY’s slopes
are only marginally signiﬁcant (about 1.9 standard errors from zero) at the 16-quarter hori-
zon. The slopes of the default spread are all within 0.7 standard errors from zero, although
demonstrating the right sign pattern. The relative bill rate retains its strong forecasting
power at long horizons with t-statistics above three from eight quarters and onwards. How-
ever, in the presence of strong macro predictors at short horizons, the slopes of the relative
bill rate do not turn positive at short horizons. The term spread remains a strong predictor
at most horizons even with the macro controls included.
From the last panel of Table 6, when we include all ﬁve risk premium proxies into the em-
pirical speciﬁcation with four macro controls, the regression explains a much larger fraction of
the variation in future payroll growth at long horizons than what can be explained by macro
controls only. Using the macro controls alone, Table 4 shows that the regression explains
only 15% and 6% of the payroll growth variation at the eight-quarter and the 16-quarter hori-
zons, respectively. Adding risk premium proxies increases the respective fractions explained
to 32% and 21%. In particular, adding risk premium proxies increases the predictive power of
the speciﬁcation at long horizons. Turning to the slopes, we observe that the dividend yield
and CAY have marginal predictive power, and the relative bill rate has signiﬁcant predictive
power at long horizons. Lagged payroll growth has reliable predictive power at short horizons,
and the GDP growth has signiﬁcant predictive power across horizons from two to 12 quarters.
Table 7 performs similar analysis as in Table 6 but using change in unemployment rate
as the dependent variable. When we add one at a time into the speciﬁcation with only the
macro controls, CAY and the default spread reproduce the dynamic sign pattern that is
consistent with the search model. However, only CAY retains marginally signiﬁcant slopes
at the 12-quarter horizon and beyond. And the long-horizon slopes of the default spread
20are all within 1.6 standard errors from zero. The dividend yield has signiﬁcantly positive
slopes at long horizons, inconsistent with the search model. But this evidence is probably
due to multicollearity: the long-horizon slopes of the lagged change in unemployment rate
are signiﬁcantly negative (these slopes are insigniﬁcant and tiny in univariate regressions, see
Table 5). The relative bill rate has strong predictive power at the four-quarter horizon and
onwards, but in the presence of strong macro controls at short horizons, especially the lagged
growth of GDP, the slopes of the relative bill rate do not turn negative at short horizons. The
term spread again retains strong predictive power even with the macro controls included.
More important, as in payroll growth regressions, the last panel of Table 7 shows that in-
cluding the risk premium proxies into the macro-control speciﬁcation substantially increases
the fraction of the variation in future change in unemployment rate at long horizons. The
macro-control speciﬁcation explains 29%, 27%, and 18% of the variation of change in un-
employment rate at the eight-, 12-, and 16-quarter horizons (see Table 5), and adding risk
premium proxies increases the adjusted R2s to 54%, 54%, and 53%, respectively. High values
of CAY forecast signiﬁcant increases in unemployment rate within the ﬁrst two quarters and
signiﬁcant decreases in unemployment rate beyond 12 quarters. The slopes of the default
spread also show the right sign pattern, but the slopes are less signiﬁcant than those of CAY.
The term spread retains strong predictive power across most horizons, whereas the dividend
yield and the relative bill rate are largely insigniﬁcant.
In all, we document that risk premium proxies add forecasting ability of labor market per-
formance primarily at long horizons, whereas standard macro controls have predictive power
mostly as short horizons. Even with the presence of strong macro controls, CAY shows the
dynamic sign pattern as predicted by the search model. We also observe the right sign pattern
in some speciﬁcations with other risk premium proxies, but CAY is the most consistent proxy.
4.4 Do Labor Market Variables Forecast Stock Market Excess
Returns?
The time series predictability literature has largely overlooked labor market variables as pre-
dictors of stock market returns. We ﬁll this gap. The empirical speciﬁcations are similar
21to those in Table 1. The dependent variables are future log excess returns on the S&P 500
index across various horizons. However, the regressors are one-quarter lagged payroll growth
or one-quarter lagged change in unemployment rate in univariate regressions, along with the
lagged values of the dividend yield, CAY, the relative bill rate, the term spread, and the
default spread in multiple regressions.
From Panel A of Table 8, payroll growth is a strong negative predictor of market excess re-
turns across all horizons. The adjusted R2 is hump-shaped: it starts at 2% at the one-quarter
horizon, peaks at 9% at the four-quarter horizon, and declines to 3% at the 16-quarter hori-
zon. The slopes are all negative, signiﬁcant for horizons up to eight quarters, and marginally
signiﬁcant at longer horizons. High payroll growth forecasts low market excess returns on av-
erage and low payroll growth forecasts high market excess returns on average from one to 16
quarters ahead, consistent with the view that the aggregate risk premium is countercyclical.
It is informative to compare the univariate regressions with payroll growth to those with
standard predictors from empirical ﬁnance in Table 1. Judged on the t-statistics and adjusted
R2 across various horizons, the predictive power of payroll growth clearly dominates that of
the default spread. The adjusted R2 of the default spread is zero across all horizons, and its
slopes are all within 0.7 standard errors from zero. Payroll growth also seems to dominate the
relative bill rate in forecasting excess returns. The adjusted R2 of the relative bill rate also
peaks at the four-quarter horizon, but at 5%, which is lower than the maximum of 9% for the
payroll growth. The slopes of the relative bill rate are mostly signiﬁcant within four quarters,
but are all within 1.5 standard errors from zero thereafter. In contrast, most t-statistics for
the payroll growth slopes are above two from the eight-quarter horizon and onwards.
The return predictive power of payroll growth is distinct from those of the dividend
yield and the term spread. Whereas the forecasting power of payroll growth concentrates in
relatively short business cycle frequencies within four quarters, the dividend yield and the
term spread achieve their predictive power at long horizons, as evidenced by their respective
maximum adjusted R2 of 14% and 11% at the 16-quarter horizon. Whereas the slopes of
payroll growth are all signiﬁcant at the 5% level within four quarters, none of the slopes of
the dividend yield and the term spread are signiﬁcant at these short horizons. Only CAY
22dominates payroll growth in predicting market excess returns.
Panel B of Table 8 includes the standard predictors along with payroll growth in fore-
casting long-horizon excess returns. Payroll growth retains signiﬁcant predictive power from
four to 12 quarters ahead and marginal predictive power at the 16-quarter horizon. In par-
ticular, judged from the t-statistics, payroll growth seems to dominate the dividend yield,
the relative bill rate, and the term spread in predicting returns. The default spread even has
all negative slopes in the multiple regressions. Again, only CAY dominates payroll growth.
Panel C shows that change in unemployment rate forecasts excess returns with a positive
sign. The slopes are positive across all horizons, signiﬁcant at the two- and four-quarter hori-
zons, and marginally signiﬁcant at the eight-quarter horizon. The adjusted R2 peaks at 5%
at the four-quarter horizon. The forecasting power of change in unemployment rate is similar
in nature with, but is quantitatively weaker than, that of payroll growth. Indeed, as shown
by Panel D, once we include the standard risk premium proxies into the speciﬁcation, the
slopes of the change in unemployment rate become universally negative, albeit insigniﬁcant.
The last two panels of Table 8 report long-horizon forecasts of market excess returns
using investment growth (the growth of ﬁxed, nonresidential investment from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis). As noted, investment as a predictor of returns has received much atten-
tion in the asset pricing literature (e.g., Cochrane (1991) and Chen and Zhang (2009)). In
contrast, payroll growth has been largely ignored. It is interesting to compare the predictive
power of payroll growth with that of investment growth. The evidence clearly is in favor of
payroll growth. Panel E shows that investment growth forecasts market excess returns with
a negative sign at short horizons. The t-statistics are slightly above two within two quarters
and are slightly below 1.8 at four quarters ahead. From the eighth quarter and onwards, the
slopes are all within 1.5 standard errors from zero, albeit still negative. The adjusted R2 is
low, only 2% even at short horizons. Panel F shows further that once we include the stan-
dard return predictors in the speciﬁcations, the slopes are within 1.5 standard errors from
zero across all horizons. Relative to the long-horizon forecasts reported in Panels A and B,
investment growth is clearly dominated by payroll growth in forecasting excess returns. The
predictive power of investment growth is largely comparable to that of change in unemploy-
23ment rate: the adjusted R2 is slightly higher for change in unemployment rate, but investment
growth retains its negative sign in slopes going from univariate to multiple regressions.
5 Conclusion
We document intriguing evidence that the stock market and the labor market are intercon-
nected. High values of aggregate risk premiums forecast low short-horizon payroll growth
but high long-horizon payroll growth. High value of risk premiums also forecast increases in
short-horizon unemployment rate but decreases in long-horizon unemployment rate. Lagged
payroll growth is a strong negative predictor for market excess returns at business cycle fre-
quencies. This predictive power is even stronger than that of several standard conditioning
variables such as the default spread and the relative Treasury bill rate. Change in unemploy-
ment rate positively predicts market excess returns, but its forecasting power is somewhat
weaker than that of payroll growth.
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26Table 1 : Forecasting Stock Market Excess Returns
This table reports results from long-horizon regressions of log excess returns on the S&P 500 index,
PH
h=1 rt+h−rft+h, in which H is the return forecast horizon in quarters. The regressors are one-period lagged
values of the consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-term Treasury bill
rate, TB, the term premium, TRM, the default premium, DEF, and their combination. For each regressor
in a given regression model, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West
corrected t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The
sample is quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A DP slope 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.27
tNW 1.61 1.75 1.88 2.06 2.22 2.48
tHD 1.59 1.61 1.60 1.53 1.38 1.21
adj-R2 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.14
B CAY slope 1.48 2.77 5.09 8.91 11.82 13.60
tNW 4.42 4.28 4.13 5.07 5.11 5.72
tHD 4.26 3.97 3.60 3.15 2.87 2.67
adj-R2 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.38
C TB slope −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
tNW −2.47 −2.44 −1.94 −1.50 −1.24 −0.98
tHD −2.30 −2.50 −2.37 −1.20 −0.80 −0.85
adj-R2 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
D TRM slope 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08
tNW 1.81 1.72 1.90 2.29 3.22 3.53
tHD 1.83 1.72 1.65 1.28 1.44 1.77
adj-R2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.11
E DEF slope 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01
tNW 0.63 0.61 0.34 −0.45 −0.50 −0.12
tHD 0.70 0.64 0.30 −0.27 −0.29 −0.07
adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F DP slope 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.19
tNW 0.91 1.15 1.42 1.60 1.79 2.02
tHD 0.90 1.09 1.26 1.15 0.87 0.76
CAY slope 1.23 2.23 3.98 7.29 9.91 11.08
tNW 3.00 3.19 3.27 3.72 3.84 4.02
tHD 2.87 2.86 2.78 2.61 2.46 2.24
TB slope −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.02
tNW −1.65 −1.84 −1.69 −0.74 0.12 0.73
tHD −1.50 −1.61 −1.64 −0.67 0.09 0.55
TRM slope 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
tNW 0.04 0.07 0.43 0.65 1.34 2.10
tHD 0.04 0.06 0.32 0.49 0.78 1.12
DEF slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.09 −0.08 −0.06
tNW −0.19 −0.39 −0.85 −1.50 −1.31 −0.76
tHD −0.19 −0.36 −0.71 −0.85 −0.62 −0.38
adj-R2 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.49
27Table 2 : Forecasting Payroll Growth with Risk Premium Proxies
This table reports long-horizonregressions of payroll growth. The dependent variable is the H-quarter growth
of seasonally adjusted total non-farm payrolls of all employees, et+H − et, in which et is the logarithm of
total payrolls in period t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of the consumption-wealth ratio,
CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-term Treasury bill rate, TB, the term premium, TRM, the
default premium, DEF, and their combination. For each regressor in a given regression model, we report the
OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992)
corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A DP slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
tNW −0.91 −0.68 −0.10 0.90 1.22 1.32
tHD −1.24 −1.05 −0.16 1.26 1.60 1.60
adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
B CAY slope −0.05 −0.07 0.03 0.33 0.56 0.73
tNW −1.58 −0.95 0.22 1.11 1.63 1.91
tHD −1.94 −1.37 0.37 1.70 2.05 2.31
adj-R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05
C TB slope 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
tNW 2.52 1.69 0.35 −2.19 −2.51 −1.97
tHD 3.40 2.57 0.51 −3.19 −3.72 −3.26
adj-R2 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02
D TRM slope 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
tNW 1.22 1.98 2.87 3.62 3.08 2.14
tHD 1.39 2.54 3.70 4.38 3.99 3.04
adj-R2 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.06
E DEF slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.01
tNW −3.02 −2.13 −1.12 −0.26 0.23 0.47
tHD −3.10 −2.61 −1.58 −0.37 0.31 0.58
adj-R2 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
F DP slope 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
tNW 0.43 0.45 0.83 1.82 1.91 1.53
tHD 0.55 0.67 1.39 2.34 2.09 1.60
CAY slope −0.11 −0.20 −0.25 −0.20 0.01 0.30
tNW −3.17 −2.73 −1.56 −0.65 0.04 0.82
tHD −3.07 −3.06 −2.29 −0.95 0.04 0.89
TB slope 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
tNW 3.89 3.32 2.55 −0.11 −0.66 −0.64
tHD 4.42 4.12 3.02 −0.18 −1.28 −1.17
TRM slope 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
tNW 5.24 5.23 5.10 4.39 2.72 1.68
tHD 5.01 5.39 5.34 5.09 3.97 2.62
DEF slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
tNW −2.58 −2.13 −1.83 −1.84 −1.13 −0.53
tHD −2.74 −2.69 −2.56 −2.07 −1.19 −0.56
adj-R2 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.13
28Table 3 : Forecasting Change in Unemployment Rate with Risk Premium Proxies
This table reports results from long-horizon regressions of change in unemployment rate on lagged variables.
The dependent variable is the H-quarter change in seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate, ut+H−ut,
in which ut is the unemployment rate in quarter t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of the
consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-term Treasury bill rate, TB,
the term premium, TRM, the default premium, DEF, and their combination. For each regressor in a given
regression model, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected t-
statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is
quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A DP slope 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.01 −0.12 −0.21
tNW 1.20 0.99 0.60 0.03 −0.16 −0.26
tHD 1.46 1.28 0.75 0.03 −0.16 −0.21
adj-R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
B CAY slope 0.96 −0.20 −7.01 −27.78 −45.91 −55.87
tNW 0.50 −0.05 −0.87 −1.77 −3.01 −4.30
tHD 0.60 −0.07 −1.29 −2.19 −2.46 −2.42
adj-R2 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.17
C TB slope −0.00 0.03 0.20 0.71 0.83 0.81
tNW −0.07 0.47 2.03 3.83 3.40 3.07
tHD −0.08 0.46 1.82 3.91 4.19 4.13
adj-R2 −0.01 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.15
D TRM slope −0.08 −0.18 −0.41 −0.78 −0.85 −0.78
tNW −3.14 −4.02 −5.09 −7.48 −6.38 −5.16
tHD −2.99 −3.55 −4.18 −4.71 −4.66 −3.92
adj-R2 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.44 0.38 0.29
E DEF slope 0.12 0.15 0.02 −0.49 −1.07 −1.42
tNW 1.60 0.89 0.05 −0.77 −1.70 −2.35
tHD 1.60 1.02 0.07 −0.88 −1.42 −1.63
adj-R2 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.06 0.11
F DP slope −0.05 −0.05 −0.11 −0.20 0.36 0.85
tNW −0.60 −0.29 −0.32 −0.42 0.63 1.24
tHD −0.62 −0.34 −0.37 −0.38 0.46 0.83
CAY slope 5.91 9.07 10.54 −1.70 −28.81 −49.89
tNW 2.89 2.69 1.60 −0.12 −1.77 −3.25
tHD 2.57 2.38 1.66 −0.13 −1.45 −2.00
TB slope −0.09 −0.14 −0.17 0.16 0.19 0.18
tNW −1.63 −1.77 −1.43 0.76 0.70 0.70
tHD −1.69 −1.82 −1.37 1.24 1.33 1.06
TRM slope −0.15 −0.30 −0.55 −0.73 −0.60 −0.39
tNW −4.80 −5.19 −5.96 −5.76 −3.15 −2.16
tHD −4.54 −4.73 −4.70 −4.63 −3.37 −1.93
DEF slope 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.24 −0.69 −1.45
tNW 2.38 1.78 1.08 0.49 −1.06 −1.92
tHD 2.16 1.80 1.13 0.40 −0.79 −1.45
adj-R2 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.43 0.43 0.43
29Table 4 : Forecasting Payroll Growth with Macro Controls
This table reports results from long-horizon predictive regressions of payroll growth. The dependent variable
is the H-quarter growth of seasonally adjusted total non-farm payrolls of all employees, et+H−et, in which et
is the logarithm of total payrolls in period t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of payroll growth,
De, proﬁt growth, Dproﬁt, growth of average Q, Dq, and growth of GDP, Dgdp. For each regressor in a given
regression, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected t-statistic,
tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is quarterly
from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A De slope 0.68 1.09 1.30 0.80 0.54 0.59
tNW 9.45 7.12 4.10 1.62 0.92 0.88
tHD 6.20 6.24 5.08 2.44 1.55 1.69
adj-R2 0.47 0.35 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.00
B Dproﬁt slope 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12
tNW 4.11 4.65 4.51 3.29 2.95 2.44
tHD 3.73 4.69 5.20 5.37 5.63 5.35
adj-R2 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02
C Dq slope 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
tNW 0.43 −0.08 −0.57 −1.08 −1.01 −0.73
tHD 0.56 −0.11 −0.86 −1.53 −1.46 −1.07
adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
D Dgdp slope 0.24 0.44 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.50
tNW 6.06 6.41 5.29 3.52 2.06 1.33
tHD 5.18 5.49 4.71 3.59 2.65 1.70
adj-R2 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.02
E De slope 0.58 0.83 0.75 −0.11 −0.46 −0.15
tNW 7.48 4.78 2.06 −0.21 −0.71 −0.18
tHD 5.13 4.73 2.59 −0.26 −0.94 −0.28
Dproﬁt slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.02
tNW −0.39 −0.25 −0.42 −0.29 −0.04 0.26
tHD −0.29 −0.25 −0.54 −0.55 −0.07 0.47
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
tNW −2.04 −2.31 −2.25 −2.46 −2.08 −1.23
tHD −1.50 −2.21 −2.64 −2.88 −2.57 −1.79
Dgdp slope 0.11 0.28 0.60 1.01 1.08 0.75
tNW 2.47 3.05 3.24 3.62 2.67 1.49
tHD 2.07 3.08 3.19 3.57 3.21 1.90
adj-R2 0.49 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.06
30Table 5 : Forecasting Change in Unemployment Rate with Macro Controls
This table reports results from long-horizon predictive regressions of change in unemployment rate. The
dependent variable is the H-quarter change in seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate, ut+H −ut, in
which ut is the unemployment rate in quarter t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of employment
growth, De, proﬁt growth, Dproﬁt, growth of average Q, Dq, and growth of GDP, Dgdp. For each regressor
in a given regression, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected
t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is
quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A Du slope 0.47 0.78 0.91 0.54 −0.02 −0.46
tNW 4.76 4.50 3.42 1.43 −0.04 −0.79
tHD 3.61 3.82 3.15 1.52 −0.06 −1.02
adj-R2 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.01 −0.01 0.00
B Dproﬁt slope −2.09 −3.70 −6.09 −6.70 −6.95 −5.11
tNW −3.35 −3.06 −3.00 −2.61 −2.42 −1.66
tHD −3.39 −3.72 −4.02 −4.20 −4.14 −2.80
adj-R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.01
C Dq slope 0.01 0.10 0.42 1.38 1.89 2.11
tNW 0.06 0.38 0.86 1.63 1.73 1.78
tHD 0.08 0.48 1.04 1.68 1.59 1.37
adj-R2 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.09
D Dgdp slope −13.77 −25.38 −43.65 −45.13 −36.61 −14.40
tNW −4.49 −4.43 −4.52 −4.09 −1.80 −0.84
tHD −3.96 −3.84 −3.42 −2.65 −1.82 −0.58
adj-R2 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.05 0.00
E Du slope 0.26 0.36 −0.08 −0.84 −1.55 −1.57
tNW 2.50 2.23 −0.30 −2.77 −4.16 −2.85
tHD 1.77 1.81 −0.30 −2.17 −3.54 −3.57
Dproﬁt slope −0.14 0.04 0.33 1.22 −0.20 −1.13
tNW −0.24 0.04 0.21 0.50 −0.08 −0.37
tHD −0.22 0.04 0.26 0.68 −0.09 −0.42
Dq slope 0.19 0.50 1.32 2.66 3.16 2.98
tNW 2.21 2.69 3.51 4.43 4.18 2.83
tHD 1.75 2.44 3.10 3.01 2.67 2.03
Dgdp slope −10.68 −23.51 −55.98 −82.12 −86.47 −61.34
tNW −3.39 −4.09 −5.41 −6.67 −4.00 −3.28
tHD −2.49 −3.13 −3.49 −3.60 −3.57 −2.34
adj-R2 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.18
31Table 6 : Payroll Growth Regressions
This table reports results from long-horizon predictive regressions of payroll growth. The dependent variable
is the H-quarter growth of seasonally adjusted total non-farm payrolls of all employees, et+H −et, in which
et is the logarithm of total payrolls in period t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of employment
growth, De, proﬁt growth, Dproﬁt, growth of average Q, Dq, growth of GDP, Dgdp, and one-period lagged
values of the consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-term Treasury bill
rate, TB, the term premium, TRM, the default premium, DEF, and their combination. For each regressor
in a given regression, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected
t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is
quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A De slope 0.59 0.86 0.79 −0.10 −0.53 −0.32
tNW 7.16 4.64 2.08 −0.20 −0.91 −0.38
tHD 5.09 4.61 2.60 −0.22 −1.04 −0.52
Dproﬁt slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.04
tNW −0.14 −0.51 −0.67 −0.18 0.30 0.58
tHD −0.10 −0.49 −0.88 −0.29 0.54 0.98
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 −0.01
tNW −2.24 −2.57 −2.31 −2.07 −1.20 −0.28
tHD −1.53 −2.24 −2.43 −2.06 −1.24 −0.33
Dgdp slope 0.09 0.27 0.58 0.98 1.07 0.80
tNW 2.29 3.02 3.23 3.53 2.56 1.50
tHD 1.87 2.98 3.25 3.44 3.13 1.95
DP slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.03
tNW −0.97 −0.89 −0.61 −0.09 0.87 1.19
tHD −0.74 −0.85 −0.70 −0.09 0.82 1.23
adj-R2 0.48 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.09
B De slope 0.58 0.83 0.77 −0.04 −0.30 0.10
tNW 7.45 4.66 2.11 −0.07 −0.46 0.12
tHD 5.12 4.63 2.64 −0.08 −0.63 0.18
Dproﬁt slope 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.02
tNW 0.01 −0.31 −0.47 −0.11 0.16 0.34
tHD 0.01 −0.30 −0.62 −0.18 0.29 0.64
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 −0.02
tNW −1.78 −2.20 −2.01 −2.06 −1.66 −0.83
tHD −1.27 −2.09 −2.39 −2.40 −2.03 −1.12
Dgdp slope 0.10 0.28 0.59 0.95 0.98 0.63
tNW 2.40 3.11 3.23 3.57 2.53 1.30
tHD 1.90 3.02 3.28 3.49 3.11 1.71
CAY slope −0.01 −0.03 0.03 0.19 0.38 0.63
tNW −0.49 −0.56 0.23 0.75 1.36 1.91
tHD −0.34 −0.51 0.28 0.93 1.42 1.89
adj-R2 0.48 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.09
32Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
C De slope 0.64 0.98 1.10 0.77 0.60 0.87
tNW 6.33 4.53 2.63 1.23 0.91 1.14
tHD 4.62 4.71 3.35 1.63 1.16 1.38
Dproﬁt slope 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
tNW 0.18 −0.07 −0.19 0.27 0.48 0.60
tHD 0.13 −0.06 −0.24 0.38 0.78 1.02
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03
tNW −1.63 −2.07 −2.08 −2.15 −1.83 −1.07
tHD −1.15 −1.94 −2.45 −2.43 −2.20 −1.51
Dgdp slope 0.08 0.24 0.51 0.78 0.81 0.51
tNW 1.97 2.49 2.73 3.06 2.21 1.09
tHD 1.63 2.65 2.86 2.85 2.52 1.30
TB slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
tNW −1.01 −1.52 −2.29 −3.63 −3.89 −3.21
tHD −0.87 −1.63 −2.61 −4.40 −4.43 −3.71
adj-R2 0.48 0.42 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.10
D De slope 0.66 1.02 1.13 0.52 0.10 0.37
tNW 8.26 5.47 2.81 0.90 0.16 0.47
tHD 5.49 5.13 3.58 1.14 0.20 0.61
Dproﬁt slope 0.00 −0.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 0.01
tNW 0.08 −0.08 −0.76 −1.12 −0.46 0.08
tHD 0.05 −0.08 −0.99 −1.90 −0.83 0.14
Dq slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03
tNW −0.92 −1.45 −1.83 −2.14 −1.63 −0.86
tHD −0.56 −1.23 −2.02 −2.36 −2.01 −1.22
Dgdp slope 0.06 0.19 0.47 0.85 0.87 0.52
tNW 1.69 2.21 2.99 3.75 2.38 1.02
tHD 1.21 2.18 2.88 3.48 3.08 1.32
TRM slope 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
tNW 2.40 2.50 2.62 2.32 1.86 1.47
tHD 1.57 2.14 2.84 2.94 2.37 1.85
adj-R2 0.54 0.47 0.35 0.26 0.18 0.09
33Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
E De slope 0.57 0.81 0.72 −0.17 −0.46 −0.05
tNW 6.81 4.28 1.93 −0.34 −0.77 −0.06
tHD 4.83 4.33 2.43 −0.39 −0.90 −0.08
Dproﬁt slope 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.01 0.01
tNW 0.19 −0.15 −0.42 −0.05 0.12 0.16
tHD 0.12 −0.13 −0.51 −0.08 0.22 0.28
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03
tNW −1.79 −2.10 −2.02 −2.26 −1.84 −0.91
tHD −1.37 −2.11 −2.55 −2.66 −2.34 −1.47
Dgdp slope 0.09 0.26 0.58 0.96 1.04 0.78
tNW 2.36 3.18 3.40 3.87 2.71 1.57
tHD 1.83 2.96 3.21 3.45 3.29 2.11
DEF slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01
tNW −0.65 −0.56 −0.32 −0.33 −0.06 0.37
tHD −0.47 −0.56 −0.39 −0.38 −0.06 0.45
adj-R2 0.48 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.06
F De slope 0.66 1.03 1.16 0.79 0.72 1.43
tNW 6.53 4.42 2.56 1.44 1.18 1.89
tHD 4.61 4.35 3.29 1.58 1.41 1.89
Dproﬁt slope 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.02 0.04
tNW 0.36 0.37 −0.11 −0.05 0.45 0.54
tHD 0.24 0.35 −0.13 −0.07 0.82 0.98
Dq slope −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.04
tNW −2.05 −2.50 −2.00 −1.97 −0.32 1.06
tHD −1.30 −1.96 −1.93 −1.64 −0.32 1.32
Dgdp slope 0.05 0.17 0.42 0.71 0.75 0.52
tNW 1.54 2.02 2.62 3.55 2.21 1.04
tHD 1.05 1.97 2.50 2.96 2.84 1.45
DP slope −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04
tNW −0.67 −0.64 0.10 1.15 1.89 2.20
tHD −0.46 −0.55 0.11 1.09 1.67 1.95
CAY slope −0.04 −0.09 −0.12 −0.10 0.21 0.72
tNW −1.68 −1.59 −0.85 −0.39 0.66 1.83
tHD −1.09 −1.32 −1.05 −0.48 0.73 1.93
TB slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
tNW −0.73 −1.30 −1.37 −2.26 −2.08 −1.89
tHD −0.68 −1.41 −1.68 −3.86 −4.41 −4.17
TRM slope 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
tNW 1.92 1.73 1.93 1.65 1.13 0.51
tHD 1.31 1.49 2.13 2.20 1.69 0.83
DEF slope −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.01
tNW −1.61 −1.47 −1.27 −1.86 −0.58 0.95
tHD −0.98 −1.24 −1.39 −1.59 −0.48 0.89
adj-R2 0.55 0.49 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.21
34Table 7 : Change in Unemployment Rate Regressions
This table reports results from long-horizon predictive regressions of change in unemployment rate. The
dependent variable is the H-quarter change in seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate, ut+H −ut, in
which ut is the unemployment rate in quarter t. The regressors are one-period lagged values of employment
growth, De, proﬁt growth, Dproﬁt, growth of average Q, Dq, growth of GDP, Dgdp, and one-period lagged
values of the consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-term Treasury bill
rate, TB, the term premium, TRM, the default premium, DEF, and their combination. For each regressor
in a given regression, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, slope, the Newey-West corrected
t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is
quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A Du slope 0.27 0.37 −0.05 −0.78 −1.47 −1.48
tNW 2.62 2.45 −0.20 −2.30 −3.60 −2.78
tHD 1.81 1.88 −0.19 −2.02 −3.40 −3.36
Dproﬁt slope −0.08 0.16 0.54 1.68 0.39 −0.43
tNW −0.15 0.17 0.36 0.73 0.17 −0.15
tHD −0.13 0.18 0.42 0.92 0.18 −0.15
Dq slope 0.41 0.99 2.16 4.48 5.54 5.79
tNW 2.92 3.37 4.51 4.70 4.35 4.87
tHD 2.31 3.04 3.61 3.63 3.34 2.71
Dgdp slope −9.71 −21.26 −52.15 −73.72 −75.54 −48.39
tNW −3.23 −4.04 −5.22 −5.97 −3.33 −2.40
tHD −2.33 −2.94 −3.33 −3.40 −3.32 −1.98
DP slope 0.18 0.42 0.71 1.55 2.02 2.39
tNW 1.99 2.27 2.44 2.74 2.59 3.07
tHD 1.63 1.98 2.03 2.23 2.04 1.84
adj-R2 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.27
B Du slope 0.26 0.35 −0.08 −0.78 −1.43 −1.41
tNW 2.39 2.09 −0.28 −2.44 −3.64 −2.54
tHD 1.72 1.77 −0.29 −2.03 −3.34 −3.22
Dproﬁt slope −0.09 0.09 0.32 0.90 −0.89 −2.11
tNW −0.17 0.09 0.21 0.38 −0.33 −0.68
tHD −0.15 0.10 0.26 0.53 −0.45 −0.85
Dq slope 0.24 0.56 1.31 2.28 2.35 1.84
tNW 2.20 2.39 2.91 3.15 2.55 1.45
tHD 1.78 2.24 2.67 2.38 1.82 1.14
Dgdp slope −11.12 −24.04 −55.89 −78.70 −79.13 −51.01
tNW −3.46 −4.02 −5.47 −6.79 −3.74 −2.63
tHD −2.52 −3.14 −3.53 −3.73 −3.72 −2.31
CAY slope 1.87 2.25 −0.39 −14.64 −31.48 −44.31
tNW 1.10 0.67 −0.06 −1.00 −2.03 −2.79
tHD 0.94 0.62 −0.06 −1.01 −1.49 −1.68
adj-R2 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.27
35Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
C Du slope 0.38 0.60 0.41 0.49 −0.20 −0.30
tNW 3.37 4.06 1.35 1.58 −0.60 −0.63
tHD 2.08 2.71 1.50 1.46 −0.54 −0.74
Dproﬁt slope −0.26 −0.23 −0.19 −0.19 −1.64 −2.48
tNW −0.48 −0.26 −0.13 −0.10 −0.72 −0.81
tHD −0.42 −0.25 −0.15 −0.11 −0.78 −0.93
Dq slope 0.16 0.42 1.16 2.22 2.71 2.55
tNW 1.70 2.16 3.13 4.73 4.45 2.73
tHD 1.33 2.00 2.74 2.53 2.25 1.70
Dgdp slope −8.67 −19.20 −47.44 −58.84 −62.79 −39.04
tNW −2.87 −3.32 −4.36 −4.91 −3.11 −2.33
tHD −2.15 −2.88 −3.17 −3.05 −3.19 −1.79
TB slope 0.07 0.15 0.30 0.83 0.84 0.79
tNW 1.53 2.57 2.98 4.86 3.98 2.91
tHD 1.27 1.84 2.49 4.15 3.81 3.43
adj-R2 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.41 0.29
D Du slope 0.30 0.45 0.14 −0.33 −1.01 −1.03
tNW 3.01 3.03 0.52 −1.25 −3.66 −2.33
tHD 1.96 2.32 0.57 −0.95 −2.53 −2.49
Dproﬁt slope −0.10 0.13 0.54 1.70 0.31 −0.62
tNW −0.18 0.14 0.40 0.88 0.13 −0.22
tHD −0.16 0.14 0.42 0.93 0.14 −0.22
Dq slope 0.09 0.25 0.73 1.32 1.73 1.54
tNW 0.86 1.20 1.84 2.44 2.40 1.49
tHD 0.67 1.08 1.61 1.41 1.32 0.95
Dgdp slope −7.65 −16.25 −38.99 −43.95 −45.58 −20.27
tNW −2.42 −2.84 −3.93 −3.86 −2.47 −1.17
tHD −1.82 −2.54 −2.85 −2.51 −2.64 −1.09
TRM slope −0.05 −0.12 −0.29 −0.65 −0.70 −0.70
tNW −2.09 −3.40 −4.84 −6.23 −4.79 −3.87
tHD −1.76 −2.48 −3.24 −4.10 −3.69 −3.28
adj-R2 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.37
36Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
E Du slope 0.26 0.38 0.01 −0.62 −1.13 −0.98
tNW 2.44 2.43 0.04 −1.78 −3.19 −1.88
tHD 1.67 1.83 0.04 −1.97 −2.84 −2.18
Dproﬁt slope −0.15 0.09 0.55 1.75 0.83 0.31
tNW −0.26 0.09 0.36 0.77 0.36 0.11
tHD −0.23 0.10 0.41 0.90 0.37 0.11
Dq slope 0.21 0.46 1.14 2.21 2.29 1.76
tNW 2.34 2.82 3.39 3.23 2.40 1.26
tHD 1.83 2.29 2.88 2.45 1.80 1.13
Dgdp slope −10.67 −23.58 −56.23 −82.72 −87.64 −62.97
tNW −3.35 −4.09 −5.60 −6.60 −3.90 −3.12
tHD −2.47 −3.10 −3.45 −3.59 −3.60 −2.41
DEF slope 0.01 −0.06 −0.22 −0.52 −1.01 −1.40
tNW 0.19 −0.35 −0.56 −0.76 −1.52 −1.51
tHD 0.14 −0.30 −0.54 −0.71 −1.07 −1.41
adj-R2 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.24
F Du slope 0.27 0.43 0.11 0.17 −0.08 0.19
tNW 2.56 2.77 0.35 0.49 −0.24 0.43
tHD 1.52 1.85 0.38 0.50 −0.20 0.37
Dproﬁt slope −0.18 0.08 0.62 1.08 0.27 −0.03
tNW −0.32 0.09 0.45 0.60 0.12 −0.01
tHD −0.27 0.09 0.45 0.61 0.13 −0.01
Dq slope 0.51 0.93 1.34 1.84 1.10 0.02
tNW 2.78 2.83 2.24 1.76 0.75 0.01
tHD 2.05 2.21 1.78 1.25 0.60 0.01
Dgdp slope −7.27 −15.80 −38.85 −43.30 −46.62 −22.82
tNW −2.40 −2.65 −3.57 −3.65 −2.21 −0.98
tHD −1.73 −2.40 −2.68 −2.38 −2.61 −1.22
DP slope 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.43 0.72 1.03
tNW 1.31 1.39 0.81 0.70 0.91 1.56
tHD 1.01 1.15 0.70 0.62 0.77 0.82
CAY slope 5.29 7.81 8.01 −4.64 −35.81 −60.93
tNW 2.73 2.27 1.10 −0.33 −2.21 −3.36
tHD 2.23 1.82 0.97 −0.28 −1.51 −2.09
TB slope 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.36 0.31 0.22
tNW 0.69 0.71 0.19 1.65 1.37 0.89
tHD 0.58 0.60 0.21 2.49 2.11 1.39
TRM slope −0.05 −0.11 −0.29 −0.43 −0.35 −0.26
tNW −1.97 −2.40 −2.93 −2.62 −1.63 −1.27
tHD −1.74 −2.10 −2.62 −2.86 −1.79 −1.20
DEF slope 0.16 0.19 0.12 −0.14 −1.28 −2.25
tNW 2.00 1.18 0.29 −0.29 −2.67 −2.94
tHD 1.50 0.89 0.25 −0.16 −1.12 −1.82
adj-R2 0.33 0.39 0.45 0.54 0.54 0.53
37Table 8 : Forecasting Stock Market Excess Returns
This table reports long-horizon regressions of log excess returns on the S&P 500 index,
PH
h=1 rt+h−rft+h, in
which H is the return forecast horizon in quarters. The regressors are one-period lagged employment growth,
De, one-period lagged unemployment rate, Du, one-period lagged investment growth, Di, with and without
one-period lagged values of the consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, log dividend yield, DP, the detrended short-
term Treasury bill rate, TB, the term premium, TRM, and the default premium, DEF. Employment is the
seasonally adjusted total non-farm payrolls of all employees and De is et −et−1, in which et is the logarithm
of employment in quarter t. Du is ut − ut−1, in which ut is the seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment
rate in quarter t, and Di is it−it−1, in which it is the logarithm of ﬁxed, private nonresidential investment in
quarter t. For each regressor in a given regression model, we report the OLS estimate of the slope coeﬃcient,
slope, the Newey-West corrected t-statistic, tNW, the Hodrick (1992) corrected t-statistic, tHD, and the
adjusted R2, adj-R2. The sample is quarterly from 1952 to 2007.
Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
A De slope −2.06 −4.08 −7.99 −8.28 −7.46 −8.92
tNW −2.35 −2.82 −3.37 −2.21 −2.10 −2.30
tHD −2.27 −2.47 −2.82 −2.03 −1.60 −1.88
adj-R2 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.03
B DP slope 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.20
tNW 1.04 1.29 1.65 1.86 2.13 2.58
tHD 1.02 1.20 1.41 1.26 0.94 0.80
CAY slope 1.09 1.97 3.29 6.33 8.93 9.71
tNW 2.58 2.73 2.69 3.24 3.40 3.46
tHD 2.46 2.45 2.22 2.23 2.21 1.93
TB slope −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08
tNW −0.63 −0.70 −0.05 1.07 1.90 2.83
tHD −0.60 −0.66 −0.05 0.91 1.36 2.02
TRM slope 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08
tNW 0.42 0.51 1.31 1.40 2.13 3.43
tHD 0.42 0.48 0.95 1.08 1.31 1.74
DEF slope −0.01 −0.02 −0.07 −0.13 −0.13 −0.12
tNW −0.60 −0.85 −1.68 −2.36 −2.09 −1.64
tHD −0.58 −0.75 −1.26 −1.27 −0.92 −0.68
De slope −0.01 −0.02 −0.07 −0.13 −0.13 −0.12
tNW −0.60 −0.85 −1.68 −2.36 −2.09 −1.64
tHD −1.46 −1.52 −2.33 −2.22 −1.71 −1.73
adj-R2 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.49
38Forecast horizon in quarters
Panel Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 16
C Du slope 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.04
tNW 1.54 2.68 3.23 1.94 1.38 0.74
tHD 1.48 2.15 2.34 1.89 1.21 0.69
adj-R2 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
D DP slope 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.19
tNW 0.88 1.07 1.35 1.61 1.82 2.05
tHD 0.87 1.01 1.18 1.11 0.85 0.74
CAY slope 1.19 2.06 3.63 6.88 9.57 10.77
tNW 2.89 2.95 2.97 3.40 3.60 3.82
tHD 2.75 2.62 2.48 2.41 2.32 2.11
TB slope −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
tNW −1.16 −0.78 −0.48 0.31 0.93 1.31
tHD −1.10 −0.75 −0.49 0.29 0.71 1.02
TRM slope 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07
tNW 0.22 0.59 1.17 1.14 1.63 2.34
tHD 0.22 0.56 0.91 0.98 1.15 1.43
DEF slope −0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.10 −0.07
tNW −0.28 −0.65 −1.22 −1.77 −1.50 −0.89
tHD −0.27 −0.58 −0.95 −1.01 −0.71 −0.44
Du slope −0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.10 −0.07
tNW −0.28 −0.65 −1.22 −1.77 −1.50 −0.89
tHD −0.48 −1.34 −1.79 −1.78 −1.09 −0.65
adj-R2 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.49
E Di slope −0.44 −0.76 −1.05 −0.73 −1.00 −1.15
tNW −2.17 −2.04 −1.79 −1.04 −1.36 −1.34
tHD −2.09 −2.00 −1.78 −0.82 −1.03 −1.18
adj-R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
F DP slope 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.20
tNW 0.96 1.21 1.47 1.58 1.81 2.10
tHD 0.94 1.16 1.34 1.17 0.91 0.78
CAY slope 1.20 2.12 3.72 7.16 9.61 10.72
tNW 2.85 2.71 2.81 3.45 3.48 3.65
tHD 2.71 2.57 2.45 2.46 2.28 2.06
TB slope −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.03
tNW −1.34 −1.35 −1.21 −0.56 0.53 1.13
tHD −1.28 −1.33 −1.24 −0.52 0.37 0.86
TRM slope 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06
tNW 0.08 0.20 0.64 0.70 1.45 2.25
tHD 0.09 0.19 0.48 0.54 0.86 1.19
DEF slope −0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.09 −0.10 −0.08
tNW −0.24 −0.54 −1.10 −1.41 −1.40 −0.93
tHD −0.24 −0.50 −0.88 −0.88 −0.69 −0.45
Di slope −0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.09 −0.10 −0.08
tNW −0.24 −0.54 −1.10 −1.41 −1.40 −0.93
tHD −0.21 −0.55 −0.79 −0.27 −0.53 −0.50
adj-R2 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.49
39Figure 1: Dynamic Relations between the Expected Return Shock, Labor
Hiring, and Employment Growth
The time-lines depict the hypothesized responses of hiring, employment growth, stock prices, and realized
returns to a one-time shock to the expected return (the discount rate). Et[rt+1] is the expected return from
the beginning to the end of period t conditional on information at the beginning of t. pt is the ex dividend
stock price at the beginning of t. µtνt is the number of new hires (a ﬂow variable) over period t. nt+1/nt is
employment growth from the beginning to the end of period t. rt+1 is the realized return from the beginning
to the end of t. We depict the time-lines for three models: standard one-period time-to-ﬁll (no time-to-plan,
Panel A), two-period time-to-ﬁll (no time-to-plan, Panel B), and one-period time-to-ﬁll (and one-period
time-to-plan, Panel C).
Panel A: One-Period Time-to-Fill (no Time-to-Plan)
-
t t + 1 t + 2
Et[rt+1] ↓ ⇒ pt ↑, µtνt ↑
rt ↑, nt+1/nt ↑
pt+1 ↓, µt+1νt+1 ↓
rt+1 ↓, nt+2/nt+1 ↓
Panel B: Two-Period Time-to-Fill (no Time-to-Plan)
-
t t + 1 t + 2
Et[rt+1] ↓ ⇒ pt ↑, µtνt ↑
rt ↑, nt+1/nt ↔
pt+1 ↓, µt+1νt+1 ↓
rt+1 ↓, nt+2/nt+1 ↑
pt+2 ↔, µt+2νt+2 ↔
rt+2 ↔, nt+3/nt+2 ↓
Panel C: One-Period Time-to-Fill (and One-Period Time-to-Plan)
-
t t + 1 t + 2
Et[rt+1] ↓ ⇒ pt ↑, µtνt ↔
rt ↑, nt+1/nt ↔
pt+1 ↓, µt+1νt+1 ↑
rt+1 ↓, nt+2/nt+1 ↑
pt+2 ↔, µt+2νt+2 ↓
rt+2 ↔, nt+3/nt+2 ↓
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